Cybersecurity Act of 2010 is Bad Medicine

Saturday, May 15, 2010

Richard Stiennon

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There are a bunch of cybersecurity bills trickling through Congress right now; some of them several years in the making. 

Senator Rockefeller’s Cybersecurity Act of 2010(S.773) is deemed the most likely to get voted on by the Senate as it was just unanimously passed through the Senate Committee that he chairs, Commerce Science and Transportation.  

It is time for the security industry to take a close look at this $1.82 billion bill as it contains some pretty drastic measures that are going to be very disruptive, and I believe detrimental. 

The preamble, labeled “Findings” sets the stage with the dramatic language we have become familiar with:

As a fundamental principle, cyberspace is a Vital asset for the nation and the United States should protect it using all instruments of national power, in order to ensure national security, public safety, economic prosperity, and the delivery of critical services to the American public.

Even though there is a definitions section “cyberspace” is never defined in S. 773.  And, setting aside the dangling participle, this is a rather broad declariation.   All instruments of national power?

There are further claims drawn from various cybersecurity experts including the President, Melissa Hathaway(author of Cyber Policy Review),Dennis Blair(Director of National Intelligence), Howard Schmidt(Cybersecurity Coordinator), Mike McConnell(former Director of National Intelligence), Paul Kurtz(Good Harbor consultant), James Lewis(Senior Fellow, CSIS), Booz Allen Hamilton, Allan Paller(SANS), and various policy think tanks, supporting the claim that cyberspace is a vital asset, and it is not secure or resilient.  

If we stipulate for the moment that cyberspace is a vital asset and the government needs to step in to make it secure and resilient let’s examine the rest of the bill to see, if enacted, it would accomplish both those goals.

Section 4 of the act requires the President to define critical infrastructure. Specifically: within 90 days of enactment:

“The President, in consultation with sector coordinating councils, relevant government agencies, and regulatory entities,shall initiate a rulemaking …, to establish a procedure for the designation of any information system the infiltration, incapacitation, or disruption of which would threaten a strategic national interests as a critical infrastructure information system under this Act."

In other words the Act requires the President to convene a bunch of meetings with as yet undefined groups to define a procedure with no timeline to designate what is and is not critical. 

Now there is a tough task. But not to worry about the implications, these amorphous bodies are also instructed to “establish a procedure…by which the owner or operator of an information system may appeal.”  

This will keep a lot of very high priced lawyers busy for years. Imagine if the NYSE or Mastercard-Visa is designated a “critical information resource.” 

Now comes the great regulatory overlay for IT security professionals, TITLE 1 – Workforce Development.
The President will be required to ask the National Academies (National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the National Academy of Engineering (NAE), the Institute of Medicine (IOM), and the National Research Council (NRC)) to conduct a one year study of existing accreditations and report after one year.

From there, within six months, the President will be required to institute accreditation requirements for cybersecurity professionals working within the Federal Government and on designated critical information systems

There will be semi-annual audits to make sure each system is in compliance and remediation plans will be worked out if a department or agency is not in compliance for two consecutive audits.

The Director of the National Science Foundation (metallurgist Arden L. Bement) shall establish a Federal Cyber Scholarship-for-Service program which will  apply  to 1,000 students that will receive free-ride scholarships plus stipends and internships. 

Promising K-12 students will also be identified for participation in summer work and internships.  I am sure the senators do not really mean to include kindergarten students. 

Funding for the scholarship program will start at $50 million in 2010 and rise to $70 million in 2014. Fifty thousand dollars a year for each student (and program overhead) should do the job.

Next up is the Cybersecurity Competition and Challenge. The Director of NIST ( physicist Patrick Gallagher) shall establish cybersecurity competitions and challenges with cash prizes not to exceed $5 million.

The competitions will include middles school students.  $15 million will be appropriated each year through 2014 for NIST to fund this.

Then comes the Cybersecurity Workforce Plan that requires every Federal agency to devlop a strategic cybersecurity workforce plan with a mindboggling array of requirements for establishing that strategy and measuring its effectiveness.

Title II – Plans and Authority.

This section gives the President 180 days to develop a Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Strategy.  The President may declare a cybersecurity emergency that invokes a “collaborative emergency response and restoration plan” to be developed as part of the Strategy.

Note this is the watered down version of the first proposed legislation, the so-called "kill switch."

Biennial Cyber Review

The President shall complete a review of the cyber posture of the United States every two years.

Cybersecurity Dashboard Pilot Project

Within a year the Secretary of Commerce (Gary Locke) shall propose and implement a “system to provide dynamic, comprehensive, real-time, cybersecurity status and vulnerability information of all Federal Government information systems managed by the Department of Commerce including an inventory of such, vulnerabilities of such systems, and corrective action plans for those vulnerabilities.” 

Apparently this would include all 15 operating units of the Department of Commerce including the Census Bureau, NOAA, and NIST. 

A very nice idea but do not underestimate the momentous size of this task or the disruption to the computing environments of the Commerce Department to pull this off within a year.

NIST Cybersecurity Guidance

This section requires NIST to promote auditable, private sector developed cybersecurity risk management measures.  Another laudable goal but I am afraid that cybersecurity risk management solutions that exist today lag the threat landscape by a number of years. 

While the Federal sector has to play catch up, the end result of successfully completing this section of the ACT will result (if completely successful) in agencies that can demonstrate they are in compliance with today’s risk management best practices but will still be completely vulnerable to advanced threats. 

The requirements of this section will also apply to US Critical Infrastructure Information Systems, creating a huge burden of compliance for an already stressed industry sector.

Joint Intelligence Threat and Vulnerability Assessment

A small section with huge impact reads in total:

“The Director of National Intelligence (Dennis Blair), the Secretary f Commerce (Gary Locke), the Secretary of Homeland Security(Janet Napolitano), the Attorney General (Eric Himpton Holder), the Secretary of Defense(Robert Gates), and the Secretary of State (Hillary Clinton) shall submit to the Congress a joint assessment of, and report on, cybersecurity threats to and vulnerabilities of Federal information systems and United States critical infrastructure information systems.”

No timeline is provided for this monumental task.

Federal Secure Products and Services Acquisitions

The Administrator of the General Services Administration (Martha N. Johnson) shall require that requests for proposals will include cybersecurity risk measurement techniques for Federal information systems products.  

Perhaps the time has come for this measure but it will add tremendous overhead to an already burdensome acquisition process.

TITLE III Cybersecurity Knowledge Development

A new cybersecurity awareness campaign that “calls on a new generation of Americans to service in the field of cybersecurity.”   

The Secretary of Education (basketball pro Arne Duncan) shall establish K-12 curriculum guidelines to address cyber safety, cybersecurity, and cyber ethics. 

The Act also provides for the funding of new cybersecurity research into how to design and build secure software, and test and verify it.

The Cybersecuity Research and Development Act will be amended to provide over $150 million in funds each year. And The Computer and Network Security Centers will receive an additional $50 million per year.

The Computer and Network Security Capacity Building Grants will be enhanced to the tune of $40 million+ per year.  The Scientific and Advanced Technology ACT Grants will be bumped up by $5 million+ per year.

The Graduate Traineeships in Computer and Network Security Research will have $20 million+ added.  Total new authorization for TITLE III comes to $1.445 Billion through 2014.


TITLE IV Public-Private Collaboration

The first step will be the creation of a Cybersecurity Advisory Panel. This panel will be called on to consult with the President on every other measure in the bill. The members will not be compensated other than for travel expenses.

State and Regional Cybersecurity Centers will be set up to "enhance the cysbersecurity of small and medium sized businesses."  The Secretary of Commerce is given 120 days to issue a description of the Centers. 

Note that it has been a year already since Congress passed an Act requiring the Small Business Administration to set up an IT Security Advisory Board. The SBA is already six months late in establishing that board.

Public-Private Clearing House

The government will review how threat information is currently shared between public and private sources and reccomend the establishment of a central clearing house for threat and vulnerability information.  That is what Infragard and US-CERT are supposed to do today.

That's it.  That is the vuanted public-private partnership that Senator Rockefeller is stumping in his latest public presentations and op-ed pieces.

Repercussions

If passed, S.773 will be an unmitigated disaster for the security industry, security professionals, and the security stance of the US government. 

Remember Sarbanes-Oxley?

There was one tiny reference to "security frameworks" in that bill that caused every security team at publicly traded companies to drop everything they were doing and document their compliance with ITIL and COBIT. 

Some would argue that is a good thing but the end result was not enhanced security postures, but enhanced record keeping.

This bill represents a gargantuan overlay on top of a vibrant industry that is finely tuned to address the rising threats that this bill attempts to address.

It will be a windfall for those involved in cyber security certification, and academics who have been left in the dust by advances in cybersecurity being developed by entreprenurial firms.

If enacted it will create a guild of government certified security professionals that have the luxury of taking the time to qualify.

And of course, those that vote for this Act will be able to point to the proactive stance they took when the next cyber embarassement occurs.

They will not have done anything to prevent the next cyber incident but they will have covered their... backs.

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Tom Caldwell Richard/ISI Readers,

I must comment that this was a well written summary and response for the proposed cyber-security act in its current proposed form. However, let's not forget the current Administrations [and past admins] track record of drafting one bill in the Senate or House, then passing it back and forth for several drastic changes or amendments (which I believe is most likely to happen here considering the tax dollars and lobbying involved).

I foresee many large established security vendors lobbying to oppose this bill or change it for their own benefit, most notably because the performance audits, certifications, and as you noted most 'risk management' products need for certification of performance or adequacy. Since their products are mostly static [meaning they haven't changed much in years nor can it within the same deliverable package], they will be seen as a 'second layer' to the new solutions and services developed with this bills resources or acquisition methods. One example we can site are traditional anti-virus products at the enterprise or end user level which we know they'll always implement, but will most likely fall behind more proactive solutions that block the risk causing an infection in the first place and limiting damage after an infection [a proactive approach to multiple threats and collateral damage from the source of the problem, not after it has multiplied or propagated]. Since ALL Federal and Military networks are heavily infected with botnets or other back-door trojans performing all types of malicious activity, it could bring less value to 'legacy' products regularly procured through various channels. Big business is resistant to change, the Federal Government even more-so, therefore I cannot see traditional companies or channels benefiting from this bill, and we all know a large number of vendors best products/technologies were acquired or bought from small to medium companies, some even at the start-up/proof in market stage.

Many will argue that more bureaucracy makes it more difficult to achieve goals, be it procurement, securing a network from hundreds of thousands of penetrations, to preventing a crippling DoS cyber-attack or 'front door' penetration into classified and unclassified networks/assets. While the certifications could 'cost' private corporations more time/money it would establish a psuedo 'common criteria' level of performance for various security sectors based on past and current proven results. Rather than agencies paying for the lowest bid [likely lower performing] it would require all products to consistently achieve the set level of performance, and this scares those vendors who slip in at a slow cost, but with a return in low overall performance. The current action by agencies I've seen is 'flipping' their system protection suite (sometimes three different vendors layers) each time it comes up for bid [one or two years in some cases]. In short they are playing wack-a-mole flipping through established products to no avail and the cost of remedying lost performance and additional support, among other losses, isn't benefiting the Federal sector or Government security at all. This is counter-productive and costly to us, the taxpayer, who has to pay for repetitive inadequacies. I'm not saying there is or ever will be a silver bullet/100% mitigation of all threats [there won't be and promises are a lie] however there are many new approaches on the horizon, and they will satisfy this bill's requirements as well as prevent significant breaches of US Government assets.

I believe that some positives will come from a comprehensive cyber-security bill, which is the cross agency awareness, funding resources, and 'standards' that will go towards developing or procuring new solutions and proven layers to the problems or gaps in existing approaches. The Federal sector may be slow to change, as the old saying goes they are 20 years behind or 20 years ahead, 'a bill' can force them to be ahead of the threat landscape by making companies worth their salt prove the effectiveness of a ‘solution’ instead of securing our Government with the lowest bid, and oldest products [not including new proposed products not listed on a GSA schedule].

Tom Caldwell
Idalis Software, InfoSec Island Partner
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James Mulholland Our haystacks to needle ratio is going to go through the roof.

Injecting increasing layers of latency and cost into a process that invites more competition by parochial interests that are at best tangential to the solution space.

This is a classic example of mission creep.

What are they thinking?
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