Kayan reports that Skype has disputed his findings in the proof-of-concept (PoC) related to this vulnerability:
"We have had this reported to us by various media outlets and have confirmed that the person is mistaken, this is not a web window and while it does cause a phone number to be underlined, does nothing other than this," a Skype spokesperson is quoted as saying.
Kayan countered Skype's dismissal of his findings with the following statements:
"First of all, they use HTML to embed all entries in Skype user's profile. The 'parser' is not validating the input, so I was able to inject HTML code (any html tags are possible). My first Skype bug was depending on these entries. Their fix was: Sanitize the output on their webservers. What about the input in the client app?"
"Does it make sense to allow users to 'embed' HTML code in their Skype profile and especially in those 'phone number' fields? Also, there is no option to define any HTML code in Skype client. I was able to find those bugs with Linux Skype client. I guess, they don't focus so much on that client. I will stop here, but you can test it."
Kayan's published PoC can be found here: http://www.noptrix.net/advisories/skype_inject.txt
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